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REGULARIZED BEST RESPONSES AND
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN GAMES
PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS AND WILLIAM H. SANDHOLM
Abstract. We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics in which
each player plays a “regularized best response” to a score vector consisting of
his actions’ cumulative payoffs. Regularized best responses are single-valued
regularizations of ordinary best responses obtained by maximizing the differ-
ence between a player’s expected cumulative payoff and a (strongly) convex
penalty term. In contrast to the class of smooth best response maps used in
models of stochastic fictitious play, these penalty functions are not required
to be infinitely steep at the boundary of the simplex; in fact, dropping this
requirement gives rise to an important dichotomy between steep and nonsteep
cases. In this general setting, our main results extend several properties of
the replicator dynamics such as the elimination of dominated strategies, the
asymptotic stability of strict Nash equilibria and the convergence of time-
averaged trajectories to interior Nash equilibria in zero-sum games.
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1. Introduction
“Reinforcement learning” has become a catch-all term for learning in recurring
decision processes where the agents’ future choice probabilities are shaped by in-
formation about past payoffs. In game theory and online optimization, most work
under this name has focused on multi-armed bandit problems, games against Na-
ture (adversarial or otherwise), or simultaneous choices by strategically interacting
players – for a panoramic introduction, see Sutton and Barto [54]. Accordingly,
reinforcement learning in games typically revolves around discrete-time stochastic
processes with the stochasticity arising at least in part from the agents’ randomized
choices – see Börgers and Sarin [10], Erev and Roth [16], Fudenberg and Levine
[20], Freund and Schapire [18], Hopkins [28], Hart and Mas-Colell [23], Beggs [6],
Leslie and Collins [37], Cominetti et al. [13], Coucheney et al. [14] and many others.
A key approach to analyzing these processes is the ordinary differential equa-
tion (ODE) method of stochastic approximation which relates the behavior of the
stochastic model under study to that of an ODE describing its mean behavior
(Benaïm [7]). Motivated by the success of this approach, we follow Sorin [53] and
Hofbauer et al. [27] by specifying a reinforcement learning scheme directly in con-
tinuous time. By so doing, we are then able to focus squarely on the deep relations
between reinforcement learning, convex analysis and population dynamics.1
Within this framework, our starting point is the following continuous-time ex-
ponential learning process: each player maintains a vector of performance scores
representing his actions’ cumulative payoffs, and these scores are converted into
mixed strategies using a logit rule which assigns choice probabilities proportionally
to the exponential of each action’s score.2 According to a well-known derivation, this
logit rule amounts to each player maximizing the difference between his expected
score and a penalty term given by the (negative) Gibbs entropy of the chosen mixed
strategy. Moreover, under this learning process, it is well known (Rustichini [49])
that mixed strategies evolve according to the replicator dynamics of Taylor and
Jonker [55], a fundamental model from evolutionary game theory.
We extend this approach by allowing for more general regularized best response
maps obtained by replacing the Gibbs entropy with an arbitrary strongly convex
penalty function. These maps include those considered in models of stochastic
fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [20], Hofbauer and Sandholm [24]) which are
generated by penalty functions that become infinitely steep at the boundary of the
simplex. In our context, this steepness assumption ensures that mixed strategies
follow an ODE contained in the interior of the simplex – in the Gibbs case, this
is simply the replicator equation of Taylor and Jonker [55]. More generally, we
find that the evolution of mixed strategies agrees with a class of evolutionary game
dynamics studied by Hofbauer and Sigmund [25], Hopkins [29] and Harper [22], and
which we study further in a companion paper (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm [41]).
1One could use the results developed in this paper to analyze discrete-time learning schemes
as in Leslie and Collins [37], Sorin [53], Coucheney et al. [14] and others, but we do not pursue
this direction here.
2The literature refers to versions of this procedure under a variety of names, including
weighted/multiplicative majority algorithm (Littlestone and Warmuth [38], Freund and Schapire
[18]), exponential weight algorithm (Sorin [53], Hofbauer et al. [27]), and Boltzmann Q-learning
(Leslie and Collins [37], Tuyls et al. [57]).
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Moving beyond these steep cases, our model also allows for penalty functions that
are (sub)differentiable over the entire simplex without becoming infinitely steep at
the boundary. The basic example here is the squared Euclidean distance under
which choice probabilities are determined by a closest point projection rule (see
Example 2.2 below). As opposed to logit choice, the image of this choice map is
the entire simplex (rather than its interior), so trajectories of play may enter and
exit the boundary of the simplex in perpetuity. As we argue below, the orbits of
this projected reinforcement learning process are solutions (in an extended sense)
of the projection dynamics of Friedman [19], another basic model of population dy-
namics from evolutionary game theory. However, this last equation only holds force
over intervals of time where the support of the players’ mixed strategies remains
constant; it does not govern the times or the manner in which this support might
change.
Our main results extend a variety of basic properties of the replicator dynam-
ics to the class of reinforcement learning dynamics under study, allowing for both
steep and nonsteep penalty functions. First, we show that (iteratively) dominated
strategies become extinct and we compute their rates of extinction.3 Second, we
extend several stability and convergence properties of Nash equilibria under the
replicator dynamics: namely, we show that a) limits of (interior) trajectories are
Nash; b) Lyapunov stable states are Nash; and c) strict Nash equilibria are asymp-
totically stable. Finally, we show that the basic properties of the time-averaged
replicator dynamics (convergence to interior equilibria in zero-sum games and as-
ymptotic agreement with the long run behavior of the best response dynamics) also
extend to the class of learning dynamics studied here.
In the paper most closely related to this one, Coucheney et al. [14] (see also Leslie
and Collins [37] and Tuyls et al. [57]) consider a reinforcement learning process in
which players choose smooth best responses to vectors of exponentially discounted
payoff estimates. Focusing exclusively on steep penalty functions, they investigate
the convergence of this process in a stochastic, discrete-time environment where
players can only observe their realized payoffs. To do so, the authors also examine
the Lyapunov and asymptotic stability properties of (perturbed) Nash equilibria
under the resulting mean dynamics in continuous time. The no-discounting limit of
these dynamics is precisely the steep version of the dynamics studied in the current
paper, so our stability and convergence results can be seen as an extension of the
analysis of Coucheney et al. [14] to the nonsteep regime. Also, Coucheney et al. [14]
do not examine the elimination of dominated strategies or the long-term behavior
of empirical frequencies of play, so our results here provide an indication of other
properties that could be expected to hold in a discrete-time, stochastic setting.
From the point of view of convex programming, the reinforcement learning dy-
namics we consider here can be seen as a multi-agent, continuous-time analogue of
the well-known mirror descent (MD) optimization method pioneered by Nemirovski
and Yudin [44] and studied further by Beck and Teboulle [5], Alvarez et al. [2], Nes-
terov [45] and many others. This observation also extends to the class of online
mirror descent (OMD) algorithms introduced by Shalev-Shwartz [52] for online
convex problems: focusing on the interplay between discrete- and continuous-time
3Interestingly, while exponential reinforcement learning eliminates dominated strategies at an
exponential rate, reinforcement learning with nonsteep penalty functions eliminates such strategies
in finite time.
4 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND W. H. SANDHOLM
OMD schemes, Kwon and Mertikopoulos [33] recently showed that a unilateral vari-
ant of the reinforcement learning dynamics studied in this paper leads to no regret
against any (locally integrable) stream of payoffs.
Our analysis relies heavily on tools from convex analysis and, in particular,
the theory of Bregman functions (Bregman [11]). Returning to the case of the
replicator dynamics, it is well known that the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence
(an oriented distance measure between probability distributions) is a potent tool
for understanding the dynamics’ long-run behavior (see Weibull [59] and Hofbauer
and Sigmund [26]). For other steep cases, this part can be played by the Bregman
divergence, a distance-like function whose role in population dynamics was noted
recently by Harper [22].4 In the nonsteep regime however, the dynamics of mixed
strategies under reinforcement learning depend intrinsically on the players’ score
vectors, which determine a strategy’s support. To contend with this, we introduce
the Fenchel coupling, an oriented measure of proximity between primal and dual
variables (that is, between mixed strategies and score vectors) that provides a
natural tool for proving elimination, convergence, and stability results.
Paper Outline. We begin in Section 2 with some game-theoretic preliminaries
and the definition of penalty functions and regularized best responses. The class
of reinforcement learning dynamics we examine is presented in Section 3, along
with several examples. Our analysis proper begins in Section 4 where we study
the elimination of dominated strategies. In Section 5, we derive some stability
and convergence properties of Nash equilibria, while in Section 6, we examine the
long-term behavior of the players’ time-averaged play. Actual, non-regularized best
responses are discussed in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation. If V is a finite-dimensional real space, its dual will be denoted by
V ∗ and we will write 〈x|y〉 for the pairing between x ∈ V and y ∈ V ∗. Also, if
S = {sα}dα=0 is a finite set, the real space spanned by S will be denoted by RS and its
canonical basis by {es}s∈S. For concision, we use α to refer interchangeably to either
sα or eα, writing e.g. xα instead of xsα ; likewise, we write δαβ for the Kronecker
delta symbols on S. The set ∆(S) of probability measures on S will be identified
with the d-dimensional simplex ∆ ≡ ∆(S) = {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0}
of RS and the relative interior of ∆ will be denoted by ∆◦ ≡ rel int(∆). Finally, if
{Sk}k∈N is a finite family of finite sets, we will use the shorthand (αk;α−k) for the
tuple (. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ) and we will write
∑k
αk
instead of
∑
αk∈Sk .
2.2. Normal form games. A finite game in normal form is a tupleG ≡ G(N,A, u)
consisting of a) a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; b) a finite set Ak of actions (or
pure strategies) per player k ∈ N; and c) the players’ payoff functions uk : A→ R,
where A ≡ ∏k Ak denotes the game’s action space, i.e. the set of all action pro-
files (α1, . . . , αN ), αk ∈ Ak. The set of mixed strategies of player k is denoted by
Xk ≡ ∆(Ak) and the space X ≡
∏
k Xk of mixed strategy profiles x = (x1, . . . , xN )
will be called the game’s strategy space. Unless mentioned otherwise, we will write
Vk ≡ RAk for the real space spanned by Ak and V =
∏
k Vk for the ambient space
of X.
4Each penalty function defines a Bregman divergence; in the case of the Gibbs entropy, the
resulting divergence is simply the KL divergence. For a comprehensive treatment, see Kiwiel [32].
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The expected payoff of player k in the mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈
X is
uk(x) =
∑1
β1
· · ·
∑N
βN
uk(β1, . . . , βN ) x1,β1 · · · xN,βN , (2.1)
where uk(β1, . . . , βN ) denotes the payoff of player k in the profile (β1, . . . , βN ) ∈ A.
Accordingly, the payoff corresponding to α ∈ Ak in the mixed profile x ∈ X is
vkα(x) ≡ uk(α;x−k) =
∑1
β1
· · ·
∑N
βN
uk(β1, . . . , βN ) x1,β1 · · · δαβk · · · xN,βN ,
(2.2)
and we will write vk(x) = (vkα(x))α∈Ak ∈ V ∗k for the payoff (co)vector of player k
at x ∈ X. The prefix “co” above is motivated by the natural duality pairing
〈vk(x)|xk〉 =
∑k
α
xkαvkα = uk(x). (2.3)
which shows that vk(x) acts on xk as a linear functional. Duality plays a basic role
in our analysis, so mixed strategies xk ∈ Vk will be treated as primal variables and
payoff vectors vk ∈ V ∗k as duals.5
Finally, a restriction of G is a game G′ ≡ G′(N,A′, u′) with the same players as
G, each with a subset A′k ⊆ Ak of their original actions and with payoff functions
u′k ≡ uk|A′ suitably restricted to the reduced action space A′ ≡
∏
k A
′
k of G
′.
2.3. Regularized best responses. In view of (2.3), a player’s best response to a
payoff vector vk ∈ V ∗k is simply
brk(vk) = arg max
xk∈Xk
〈vk|xk〉 . (2.4)
A standard way of obtaining a single-valued analogue of (2.4) is to introduce a
penalty term that is (at least) strictly convex in xk. It is also customary to assume
that such penalties are “infinitely steep” at the boundary of the simplex (see e.g.
Fudenberg and Levine [20]), but we obtain a much richer theory by dropping this
requirement. Formally:
Definition 2.1. Let ∆ be the unit d-dimensional simplex of Rd+1. We say that
h : ∆→ R is a penalty function on ∆ if:
(1) h is continuous on ∆.
(2) h is smooth on the relative interior of every face of ∆.6
(3) h is strongly convex on ∆: there exists some K > 0 such that
h(tx1 + (1− t)x2) ≤ th(x1) + (1− t)h(x2)− 12Kt(1− t) ‖x1 − x2‖2 , (2.5)
for all x1, x2 ∈ ∆ and for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, if limxn→x ‖dh(xn)‖ = +∞, we will say that h is steep at x – or, more
simply, that h is steep if this holds for all x ∈ bd(∆). Finally, h is called decompos-
able with kernel θ if
h(x) =
∑d
β=0
θ(xβ), (2.6)
for some continuous and strongly convex θ : [0, 1]→ R that is smooth on (0, 1].
5Even though this distinction is rarely made in game theory, it is standard in learning and
optimization – see e.g. Rockafellar [48], Nemirovski and Yudin [44], Shalev-Shwartz [52].
6More precisely, we posit here that h(γ(t)) is smooth for every smooth curve γ : (−ε, ε) → ∆
that is entirely contained in the relative interior of a face of C.
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Remark 2.1. For differentiation purposes, it will often be convenient to assume that
the domain of h is the “thick simplex” ∆ε = {x ∈ RS : xα ≥ 0 and 1−ε <
∑
α xα <
1 + ε}; doing so allows us to carry out certain calculations in terms of standard
coordinates, but none of our results depend on this device. Also, “smooth” should
be interpreted above as “C∞-smooth”; our analysis actually requires C2 smoothness
only if the Hessian of h is involved (and no differentiability otherwise), but we will
keep the C∞ assumption for simplicity.
Given a penalty function h on ∆ ⊆ V ≡ Rd+1, the concave maximization problem
maximize 〈y|x〉 − h(x),
subject to x ∈ ∆, (2.7)
admits a unique solution for all y ∈ V ∗, so the operator arg maxx {〈y|x〉 − h(x)}
becomes single-valued. We thus obtain:
Definition 2.2. The regularized best response map (or choice map) Q : V ∗ → ∆
induced by a penalty function h on ∆ is
Q(y) = arg maxx∈∆ {〈y|x〉 − h(x)} , y ∈ V ∗. (2.8)
Under the steepness and (strong) convexity requirements of Definition 2.1, the
discussion in Rockafellar [48, Chapter 26] shows that the induced choice map Q is
smooth and its image is the relative interior ∆◦ of ∆; otherwise, if h is nowhere
steep, the image of Q is the entire simplex (cf. Remark B.1 in Appendix B). We
illustrate this dichotomy with two representative examples (see also Section 3.4):
Example 2.1. The classic example of a steep penalty function is the (negative) Gibbs
entropy
h(x) =
∑d
α=0
xα log xα. (2.9)
As is well known, the induced choice map (2.8) is the so-called logit map
Gα(y) =
exp(yα)∑d
β=0 exp(yβ)
. (2.10)
Since h is steep, imG = ∆◦.
Example 2.2. The basic example of a non-steep penalty function is the quadratic
penalty
h(x) =
1
2
∑d
β=0
x2β . (2.11)
The induced choice map (2.8) is the (Euclidean) projection map
Π(y) = arg maxx∈∆
{
〈y|x〉 − 12 ‖x‖22
}
= arg minx∈∆ ‖y − x‖22 = proj∆ y, (2.12)
where proj∆ denotes the closest point projection to ∆ with respect to the standard
Euclidean norm ‖·‖2 on Rd+1. Obviously, im Π = ∆.
Remark 2.2. Up to mild technical differences, penalty functions are also known
as regularizers in online learning and as Bregman functions (or prox-functions) in
convex analysis; for comprehensive treatments, see Bregman [11], Nemirovski and
Yudin [44], Shalev-Shwartz [52] and references therein. The term “decomposable”
is borrowed from Alvarez et al. [2].
Choice maps generated by steep penalty functions are called smooth best response
functions by Fudenberg and Levine [20]; in a similar vein, drawing on a connection
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between deterministic and stochastic payoff perturbations, Hofbauer and Sandholm
[24] use the terminology “perturbed best responses” while McKelvey and Palfrey
[39] call such maps “quantal response functions”.
Remark 2.3. Several models of smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [20],
Hofbauer and Sandholm [24]) use a steep penalty function with positive-definite
Hessian. Concerning this last condition, the strong convexity of h imposes a positive
lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue of Hess(h), a property which in turn ensures
that the associated choice map Q is Lipschitz continuous (Proposition B.1); later,
we also take advantage of the fact that strong convexity provides a lower bound
for the so-called Bregman divergence between points in ∆ (Proposition B.2). Both
properties simplify our presentation considerably, so we will not venture beyond
strongly convex penalty functions.
3. A Class of Reinforcement Learning Dynamics
3.1. Definition and basic examples. The basic reinforcement learning scheme
that we consider is that at each moment t ≥ 0, every player k ∈ N of a finite game
G ≡ G(N,A, u) plays a regularized best response Qk(yk) to a score vector yk ∈ V ∗k
consisting of his actions’ aggregate payoffs. More precisely, this amounts to the
continuous-time process:
yk(t) = yk(0) +
∫ t
0
vk(x(s)) ds,
xk(t) = Qk(yk(t)),
(RL)
or, in differential form:
y˙k = vk(Q(y)), (3.1)
where Q ≡ (Q1, . . . , QN ) : V ∗ ≡
∏
k V
∗
k → X and y = (y1, . . . , yN ) ∈ V ∗ denote the
players’ choice and score profiles respectively. In the above, the (primal) strategy
variable xk(t) ∈ Xk describes the mixed strategy of player k at time t, the (dual)
score vector yk(t) aggregates the payoffs of the pure strategies α ∈ Ak of player
k, Accordingly, the basic interpretation of (RL) is that each player observes the
realized expected payoffs of his strategies over a short interval of time and then
uses these payoffs to update his score vector.
More precisely, in the stochastic approximation language of Benaïm [7], (RL) is
simply the mean field of the discrete-time stochastic process
Ykα(n+ 1) = Ykα(n) + vˆkα(n),
Xkα(n+ 1) = Qkα(Yk(n+ 1)),
(3.2)
where Xkα(n) is the probability of playing α ∈ Ak at time n = 1, 2, . . . , and vˆkα(n)
is an unbiased estimator of vkα(X(n)). If player k can observe the action profile
α−k(n) played by his opponents (or can otherwise calculate his strategies’ payoffs),
such an estimate is provided by vˆkα(n) = uk(α;α−k(n)). If instead player k can
only observe the payoff uˆk(n) = uk(αk(n);α−k(n)) of his chosen action αk(n), a
standard choice for vˆk(n) is
vˆkα(n) = uˆk(n)/Xkα(n) if αk(n) = α, (3.3)
where the division by Xkα(n) compensates for the infrequency with which the score
of strategy α is updated. Estimator (3.3) is sound if the penalty function of player
k is steep (see Leslie and Collins [37] and Coucheney et al. [14]); otherwise, Xkα(n)
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may become zero, in which case the links between (3.3) and our continuous-time
model are less clear.
We begin with two representative examples of the reinforcement learning dy-
namics (RL):
Example 3.1. If Q is the logit map (2.10) of Example 2.1, players select actions
with probability proportional to the exponential of their aggregate payoffs. In this
case, (RL) boils down to the exponential (or logit) reinforcement learning process:
y˙kα = vkα(x),
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑k
β exp(ykβ)
.
(XL)
In a single-agent, online learning context, the discrete-time version of (XL) first ap-
peared in the work of Vovk [58] and Littlestone and Warmuth [38] – see also Rusti-
chini [49], Sorin [53], and Kwon and Mertikopoulos [33] for a continuous-time anal-
ysis. In a game-theoretic setting, this process has been studied by (among others)
Freund and Schapire [18], Hofbauer et al. [27] and Mertikopoulos and Moustakas
[40], while Leslie and Collins [37], Tuyls et al. [57] and, more recently, Coucheney
et al. [14] considered a discounted variant that we describe in Section 3.2 below.
Differentiating xkα in (XL) with respect to time and substituting yields
x˙kα =
y˙kαe
ykα
∑k
β e
ykβ − eykα∑kβ y˙kβeykβ(∑k
β e
ykβ
)2 = xkα [y˙kα −∑kβ xkβ y˙kβ
]
, (3.4)
so, with y˙kα = vkα(x), we readily obtain:
x˙kα = xkα
[
vkα(x)−
∑k
β
xkβvkβ(x)
]
. (RD)
This equation describes the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker [55], so the
evolution of mixed strategies under (XL) agrees with a fundamental model of evo-
lutionary game theory whose long-term rationality properties are quite well un-
derstood. This basic relation between exponential reinforcement learning and the
replicator dynamics was noted in a single-agent environment by Rustichini [49]
and was explored further in a game-theoretic context by Hofbauer et al. [27] and
Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [40].
Example 3.2. If Q is the projection map (2.12) of Example 2.2, (RL) leads to the
projected reinforcement learning process:
y˙k = vk(x),
x = projX y.
(PL)
Of course, since projX y is not smooth in y, we can no longer use the same approach
as in (3.4) to derive the dynamics of the players’ mixed strategies xk. Instead, recall
(or solve the defining convex program to show) that the closest point projection on
Xk = ∆(Ak) takes the simple form(
projXk yk
)
α
= max{ykα + µk, 0}, (3.5)
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where µk ∈ R is such that
∑k
α max{ykα + µk, 0} = 1. We can thus write
xkα(t) =
{
ykα(t) + µk(t) if α ∈ A′k,
0 otherwise.
(3.6)
Therefore, if Ik is an open time interval over which xk(t) = projXk yk(t) has constant
support A′k ⊆ Ak, differentiating (3.6) for t ∈ Ik yields
x˙kα = y˙kα + µ˙k = vkα + µ˙k for all α ∈ A′k. (3.7)
Since
∑
α∈A′k x˙kα = 0, summing over α ∈ A
′
k gives
0 =
∑
α∈A′k
vkα + µ˙k |A′k| , (3.8)
so, by substituting into (3.7) and rearranging, we obtain the projection dynamics:
x˙kα =
{
vkα(x)− |supp(xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(xk)
vkβ(x) if α ∈ supp(xk),
0 if α /∈ supp(xk).
(PD)
The dynamics (PD) were introduced in game theory by Friedman [19] as a geo-
metric model of the evolution of play in population games.7 The previous discussion
shows that the projected orbits x(t) = projX y(t) of the learning scheme (PL) sat-
isfy the projection dynamics (PD) on every open interval over which the support
of x(t) is fixed; furthermore, as we argue below, the union of these intervals is
dense in [0,∞). In this way, orbits of (PL) that begin in the relative interior X◦
of the game’s strategy space may attain a boundary face in finite time, then move
to another boundary face or re-enter X◦ (again in finite time), and so on. Thus,
although x(t) may fail to be differentiable when it moves from (the relative interior
of) one face of X to another, it satisfies (PD) for all times in between.
These two examples illustrate a fundamental dichotomy between reinforcement
learning processes induced by steep and nonsteep penalty functions. In the steep
case, the dynamics of the strategy variable are well-posed and admit unique solu-
tions that stay in X◦ for all time. On the other hand, in the nonsteep regime, the
dynamics of the strategy variable only admit solutions in an extended sense, and
may enter and exit different faces of X in perpetuity.
Remark 3.1. In several treatments of stochastic fictitious play (Fudenberg and
Levine [20], Hofbauer and Sandholm [24]), it is common to replace h(x) with ηh(x)
for some positive parameter η > 0 which is often called the noise level.8 For
instance, if h is the Gibbs entropy (2.9), this adjustment leads to the choice map
Gγα(y) =
exp(γyα)∑d
β=0 exp(γyβ)
. (3.9)
where γ = η−1. If y is fixed, choices are nearly uniform for small γ; on the other
hand, for large γ, almost all probability is placed on the pure strategies with the
highest score.
7Nagurney and Zhang [43] (see also Lahkar and Sandholm [34] and Sandholm et al. [51])
introduce related projection-based dynamics for population games. The relations among the
various projection dynamics are explored in a companion paper (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm
[41]).
8The term “noise level” reflects the fact that η essentially controls the magnitude of the per-
turbation to the player’s expected payoff in the regularized maximization problem (2.7).
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In the present context, replacing hk(xk) with ηkhk(xk) and writing γk = η−1k
yields the following variant of (RL):
y˙k = vk(x),
xk = Qk(γkyk),
(3.10)
Since a rescaled penalty function is itself a penalty function, (3.10) can be viewed
as an instance of (RL); therefore, our results for the latter also apply to the former.
Furthermore, because the score variables yk(t) scale with t, introducing γ has less
drastic consequences under (RL) than under stochastic fictitious play: for instance,
the stationary points of (RL) in X remain unaffected by this choice – see Theorem
5.2 below.
One can also consider a variant of (RL) under which different players adjust
their score variables at different rates:
y˙k = γkvk(x),
xk = Qk(yk),
(RLγ)
Evidently, this process is equivalent to (3.10), but with initial conditions yk(0)
scaled by 1/γk. As we show in Propositions 4.2 and 5.4, the choice of γ affects
the speed at which (3.10) evolves because it determines each player’s characteristic
time scale.
3.2. Related models. Before proceeding with our analysis of (RL), we mention
a number of related models appearing in the literature.
First, as an alternative to aggregating payoffs in (RL), one can consider the
exponentially discounted model
yk(t) = yk(0)λ
t +
∫ t
0
λt−svk(x(s)) ds, (3.11)
where the discount rate λ ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative weight of past observa-
tions. This variant was examined by Leslie and Collins [37], Tuyls et al. [57], and
Coucheney et al. [14] for smooth best response maps generated by steep penalty
functions. Obviously, when h is steep, (RL) can be seen as a special case of (3.11)
in the limit λ→ 1−; in contrast to (RL) however, discounting implies that the score
variable yk(t) remains bounded, thus preventing the agents’ mixed strategies from
approaching the boundary of X. For instance, under the logit rule of Example 3.1,
Coucheney et al. [14] showed that mixed strategies follow a differential equation
that combines the replicator dynamic with an additional term which repels orbits
from the boundary bd(X) of X.
In a single-agent environment, payoffs are determined at each instance by nature
so the reinforcement learning process (RL) becomes:
yα(t) = yα(0) +
∫ t
0
vα(s) ds, x(t) = Q(y(t)). (3.12)
In this context, (RL) can be seen as a continuous-time analogue of the family of
online learning algorithms known as online mirror descent (OMD) – for a compre-
hensive account, see Bubeck [12] and Shalev-Shwartz [52]. The resulting interplay
between discrete and continuous time has been analyzed by Sorin [53] and Kwon
and Mertikopoulos [33] who showed that (3.12) leads to no regret against any locally
integrable payoff stream v(t) in V ∗.
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In view of the above, (RL) essentially extends the discounted dynamics of Leslie
and Collins [37] to the nonsteep regime and the online learning dynamics of Kwon
and Mertikopoulos [33] to a multi-agent, game-theoretic setting. That being said,
there are several reinforcement learning schemes that are distinct from (RL) but
which still lead to the replicator equation (RD). A leading model of this kind is
presented in the seminal paper of Erev and Roth [16]: after player k chooses pure
strategy α ∈ Ak, he increments its score by the payoff he receives (assumed positive)
and then updates his choice probabilities proportionally to each action’s score. The
continuous-time, deterministic version of this model is
y˙kα = xkαvkα(x),
xkα =
ykα∑k
β ykβ
, (ER)
where the xkα term in the first equation reflects the fact that the score variable ykα is
only updated when α is played. A simple calculation then shows that the evolution
of mixed strategies is governed by the replicator dynamics (RD) up to a player-
specific multiplicative factor of
∑k
β ykβ . Versions of this model have been studied
by Posch [46], Rustichini [49], Hopkins [30], Beggs [6], and Hopkins and Posch
[31]; Rustichini [49] also considers hybrids between (XL) and (ER) in nonstrategic
settings.
Börgers and Sarin [10] also consider a variant of the learning model of Cross [15]
where there is no separate score variable. Instead, if player k chooses pure strategy
α, he increases the probability with which he plays α and decreases the probability
of every other action β 6= α proportionally to the payoff vkα(x) ∈ (0, 1) that the
player obtained. The continuous-time, deterministic version of this model is
x˙kα = xkα(1− xkα)vkα(x) +
∑
β 6=α xkβ(0− xkα)vkβ(x), (3.13)
so, after a trivial rearrangement, we obtain again the replicator equation (RD).
3.3. Basic results. We start our analysis by showing that the dynamics (RL) are
well-posed even if the players’ penalty functions are not steep:
Proposition 3.1. The reinforcement learning process (RL) admits a unique global
solution for every initial score profile y(0) ∈ V ∗.
Proof. By Proposition B.1, strong convexity implies that Q : V ∗ → X is Lipschitz.
Since vk is bounded, existence and uniqueness of global solutions follows from stan-
dard arguments – e.g. Robinson [47, Chapter V]. 
We turn now to the dynamics induced by (RL) on the game’s strategy space
X. To that end, if y(t) is a solution orbit of (RL), we call x(t) = Q(y(t)) the
trajectory of play induced by y(t) – or, more simply, an orbit of (RL) in X. Mirroring
the derivation of the projection dynamics (PD) above, our next result provides a
dynamical system on X that is satisfied by smooth segments of orbits of (RL) in X.
To state the result, let
gαβk (xk) = Hess (h
′
k(xk))
−1
αβ , α, β ∈ supp(xk), (3.14)
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denote the inverse Hessian matrix of the restriction h′k ≡ hk|X′k of the penalty func-
tion of player k to the face X′k = ∆(supp(xk)) of Xk that is spanned by supp(xk).
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Furthermore, let
gαk (xk) =
∑
β∈supp(xk)
gαβk (xk) and Gk(xk) =
∑
α∈supp(xk)
gαk (xk) (3.15)
denote the row sums and the grand sum of gαβk (xk) respectively. We then have:
Proposition 3.2. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) in X, and let I be an
open interval over which the support of x(t) remains constant. Then, for all t ∈ I,
x(t) satisfies:
x˙kα =
∑
β∈supp(xk)
[
gαβk (xk)−
1
Gk(xk)
gαk (xk)g
β
k (xk)
]
vkβ(x), α ∈ supp(xk).
(RLD)
Corollary 3.3. Every orbit x(t) = Q(y(t)) of (RL) in X is Lipschitz continuous
and satisfies (RLD) on an open dense subset of [0,∞). Furthermore, if the players’
penalty functions are steep, (RLD) is well-posed and x(t) is an ordinary solution
thereof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let A′k denote the (constant) support of xk(t) for t ∈
I. Then, the first-order Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for the softmax
problem (2.7) of player k readily yield
ykα − ∂h
′
k
∂xkα
= µk for all α ∈ A′k, (3.16)
where h′k = hk|X′k is the restriction of hk to X′k = ∆(A′k) and µk is the Lagrange
multiplier associated to the constraint
∑
α∈A′k xkα = 1. Differentiating (3.16) then
yields
y˙kα −
∑
β∈A′k
∂2h′k
∂xkα∂xkβ
x˙kβ = µ˙k, (3.17)
and hence
x˙kα =
∑
β∈A′k
gαβk (xk) (vkβ(x)− µ˙k) =
∑
β∈A′k
gαβk (xk)vkβ(x)− gαk (xk)µ˙k, (3.18)
where we have used the fact that y˙k = vk. However, since xk(t) ∈ X′k for all t ∈ I
by assumption, we must also have
∑
α∈A′k x˙kα = 0; accordingly, (3.18) gives
0 =
∑
α,β∈A′k
gαβk (xk)vkβ(x)− µ˙k
∑
α∈A′k
gαk (xk) =
∑
β∈A′k
gβk (xk)vkβ(x)−Gk(xk)µ˙k,
(3.19)
so (RLD) is obtained by solving (3.19) for µ˙k and substituting in (3.18). 
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Lipschitz continuity follows from Proposition 3.1 and the
Lipschitz continuity of Q (Proposition B.1). To establish the next claim, we must
show that the union of all open intervals over which x(t) has constant support is
dense in [0,∞). To do so, fix some α ∈ Ak, k ∈ N, and let A = {t : xkα(t) > 0}
so that Ac = x−1kα(0); then, if B = int(A
c), it suffices to show that A ∪ B is dense
9Strong convexity ensures that Hess(h′k) is positive-definite – and, hence, invertible (cf. Remark
2.3).
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in [0,∞). Indeed, if t /∈ cl(A ∪ B), we must have t /∈ A and hence xkα(t) = 0.
Furthermore, since t /∈ cl(A), there exists a neighborhood U of t that is disjoint
from A, i.e. xkα = 0 on U . Since U is open, we get U ⊆ int(Ac) = B, contradicting
that t /∈ B.
Finally, to prove the second part of our claim, simply note that the image imQk
of Qk coincides with the relative interior X◦k of Xk if and only if hk is steep (cf.
Proposition B.1). 
Remark 3.2. If the players’ penalty functions can be decomposed as hk(xk) =∑k
β θk(xkβ) (cf. Definition 2.1), the inverse Hessian matrix of hk may be written
as
gαβk (xk) =
δαβ
θ′′k(xkα)
, α, β ∈ supp(xk). (3.20)
In this case, (RLD) may be written more explicitly as
x˙kα =
1
θ′′k(xkα)
[
vkα(x)−Θ′′k(xk)
∑
β∈supp(xk)
vkβ(x)
/
θ′′k(xkβ)
]
, (RLDθ)
where Θ′′k stands for the harmonic aggregate
10
Θ′′k(xk) =
[∑
β∈supp(xk)
1/θ′′k(xkβ)
]−1
. (3.21)
To the best of our knowledge, the separable dynamics (RLDθ) first appeared in
a comparable form in the work of Harper [22] under the name “escort replicator
dynamics”.11 From the perspective of convex programming, the dynamics (RLDθ)
for steep θ (and, more generally, (RLD) for steep h) can be seen as a game-theoretic
analogue of the Hessian Riemannian gradient flow framework developed by Alvarez
et al. [2]. As such, (RLD) exhibits a deep Riemannian-geometric character which
links it to class of dynamics introduced by Hofbauer and Sigmund [25] and studied
further by Hopkins [28]. These geometric aspects of (RLD) are explored in detail
in a companion paper (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm [41]).
3.4. Further examples. In Section 3.1, we introduced the exponential and pro-
jected reinforcement learning models (XL) and (PL), generated respectively by
the (steep) entropic penalty (2.9) and the (nonsteep) quadratic penalty (2.11). We
close this section with some further examples of penalty functions and their induced
mixed strategy dynamics.
Example 3.3 (The Tsallis entropy and the q-replicator dynamics). A well known
generalization of the Gibbs (negative) entropy due to Tsallis [56] is:12
h(x) = [q(1− q)]−1
∑
β
(xβ − xqβ), q > 0, (3.22)
with the continuity convention (z − zq)/(1 − q) = z log z for q = 1 (corresponding
to the Gibbs penalty of Example 2.1). In this context, some easy algebra shows
10We should stress here that Θ′′k is not a second derivative; we only use this notation for visual
consistency.
11See also Coucheney et al. [14] for a variant of (RLDθ) induced by the exponentially discounted
model (3.11).
12In information theory, the Tsallis entropy is often referred to as the Havrda–Charvát entropy.
Note that definition (3.22) uses initial constant [q(1−q)]−1 rather than the more common (1−q)−1.
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that (RLD) reduces to the q-replicator dynamics:
x˙kα = x
2−q
kα
[
vkα − rq−2k,q
∑k
β
x2−qkβ vkβ
]
, (RDq)
where r2−qk,q =
∑k
β x
2−q
kβ (and 0
0 = 0 for q = 2). In the context of convex program-
ming, (RDq) was derived as an example of a Hessian Riemannian gradient flow
in Alvarez et al. [2]; more recently, these dynamics also appeared in Harper [22]
under the name “q-deformed replicator dynamics”. Obviously, for q = 1, (RDq)
is simply the replicator equation (RD), reflecting the fact that the Tsallis penalty
(3.22) converges to the Gibbs penalty (2.9) as q → 1. Furthermore, for q = 2, the
Tsallis penalty (3.22) is equal to the quadratic penalty (2.11) up to an affine term;
consequently, since (RLDθ) does not involve the first derivatives of h, the dynamics
(RDq) for q = 2 are the same as the projection dynamics (PD).
Of course, (3.22) is steep if and only if 0 < q ≤ 1, so (RDq) may fail to be
well-posed for q > 1; in particular, as in the case of the projection dynamics (RD),
the orbits of (RDq) for q > 1 may run into the boundary of the game’s strategy
space in finite time. In this way, (RDq) provides a smooth interpolation between
the replicator dynamics and the projection dynamics (obtained for q = 1 and q = 2
respectively), with the replicator equation defining the boundary between the well-
and ill-posed regimes of (RDq).
Example 3.4 (The Rényi entropy). The Rényi (negative) entropy is defined by
h(x) = −(1− q)−1 log
∑
β
xqβ (3.23)
for q ∈ (0, 1). Just like its Tsallis counterpart, (3.23) is steep for all q ∈ (0, 1) and it
approaches the Gibbs penalty (2.9) as q → 1−; unlike (3.22) though, (3.23) is not
decomposable.
Dropping momentarily the player index k, an easy calculation shows that
∂α∂βh = q
2(1− q)−1ξαξβ + qδαβ(ξ2α + ξα/xα), (3.24)
where ξα = x−1α (xα/rq)q and rqq =
∑
β x
q
β . It can then be shown that the inverse
matrix of Hess(h) is gαβ = −xαxβ + q−1δαβξαxβ , so some more algebra leads to
the Rényi dynamics:
x˙kα = q
−1ξkαxkα [vkα − vk,q] + (1− q)−1xkα(1− ξkα) [vk,q − v¯k] , (ReD)
where vk,q =
∑k
β xkβξkβvkβ , v¯k =
∑k
β xkβvkβ and the player index has been rein-
stated. Thus, with ξkα = x−1kα(xkα/rk,q)
q → 1 as q → 1, the replicator dynamics
(RD) are immediately recovered in the limit q → 1.
Example 3.5 (The log-barrier). An important nonexample of a penalty function is
the logarithmic barrier:
h(x) = −
∑
β
log xβ . (3.25)
Obviously, (3.25) is steep, strongly convex and decomposable, but it fails to be
finite at the boundary bd(∆) of ∆. Nevertheless, it can be obtained from the Tsallis
penalty (3.22) in the limit q → 0+ and the recipe (RLDθ) yields the dynamics
x˙kα = x
2
kα
[
vkα − r−2k
∑k
β
x2kβvkβ
]
, (LD)
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Figure 1. Evolution of play under the reinforcement learning dynam-
ics (RL) in Matching Pennies (Nash equilibria are depicted in dark red
and stationary points in light/dark blue; for the game’s payoffs, see the
vertex labels). As the deformation parameter q of (RDq) decreases, we
pass from the nonsteep regime (q > 1) where the orbits of (RL) in X
collide with the boundary of X in finite time, to the steep regime (q ≤ 1)
where (RDq) becomes well-posed.
with r2k =
∑k
β x
2
kβ . The system (LD) is easily seen to be well-posed and it cor-
responds to the q → 0+ limit of (RDq). In convex optimization, (LD) was first
considered by Bayer and Lagarias [4] and it has since been studied extensively in
the contexts of linear and convex programming – see e.g. Fiacco [17], Kiwiel [32],
Alvarez et al. [2] and Laraki and Mertikopoulos [36]. The results that we derive
in the rest of the paper for (RL) remain true in the case of (LD), but we do not
provide proofs.
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4. Elimination of Dominated Strategies
We begin our rationality analysis with the elimination of dominated strategies.
Formally, if G ≡ G(N,A, u) is a finite game in normal form, we say that qk ∈ Xk is
dominated by q′k ∈ Xk and we write qk ≺ q′k when
uk(qk;x−k) < uk(q′k;x−k) for all x−k ∈ X−k ≡
∏
` 6=k X`. (4.1)
Thus, for pure strategies α, β ∈ Ak, we have α ≺ β whenever
vkα(x) < vkβ(x) for all x ∈ X. (4.2)
If (4.1) is strict for only some (but not all) x ∈ X, we will say that qk is weakly
dominated by q′k and we will write qk 4 q′k; conversely, we will say that q =
(q1, . . . , qN ) ∈ X is undominated if no component qk ∈ Xk of q is weakly dominated.
Of course, if dominated strategies strategies are removed from G, other strategies
may become dominated in the resulting restriction of G, leading to the notion of
iteratively dominated strategies. Accordingly, a strategy which survives all rounds
of elimination is called iteratively undominated.
For a given trajectory of play x(t) ∈ X, t ≥ 0, we say that the pure strategy
α ∈ Ak becomes extinct along x(t) if xkα(t)→ 0 as t→∞. More generally, following
Samuelson and Zhang [50], we say that the mixed strategy qk ∈ Xk becomes extinct
along x(t) if min{xkα(t) : α ∈ supp(qk)} → 0; otherwise, we say that qk survives.
Extending the classic elimination results of Akin [1], Nachbar [42], and Samuelson
and Zhang [50], we first show that only iteratively undominated strategies survive
under (RL):
Theorem 4.1. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) in X. If qk ∈ Xk is
dominated (even iteratively), then it becomes extinct along x(t).
In the case of the replicator dynamics, most proofs of elimination of dominated
strategies involve some form of the Kullback–Leibler divergence DKL(qk, xk) =∑k
α qkα log(qkα/xkα), an asymmetric measure of the “distance” between qk and xk;
in particular, to show that qk is eliminated along xk(t) it suffices to show that
DKL(qk, xk(t)) → +∞. Following Bregman [11], the same role for a steep penalty
function h : ∆→ R is played by the so-called Bregman divergence:
Dh(q, x) = h(q)− h(x)− 〈dh(x)|q − x〉 , q ∈ ∆, x ∈ ∆◦, (4.3)
where dh(x) denotes the differential of h at x (so Dh(q, x) is just the difference
between h(q) and the estimate of h(q) based on linearization at x).13
On the other hand, since (RLD) may fail to be well-posed if the players’ penalty
functions are not steep, we must analyze the reinforcement learning dynamics (RL)
directly on the dual space V ∗ where the score variables y evolve. To do so, we
introduce the Fenchel coupling between qk ∈ Xk and yk ∈ V ∗k , defined as
Pk(qk, yk) = hk(qk) + h
∗
k(yk)− 〈yk|qk〉 , (4.4)
where
h∗k(yk) = max
xk∈Xk
{〈yk|xk〉 − hk(xk)} (4.5)
denotes the convex conjugate of the penalty function hk : Xk → R of player k. Our
choice of terminology above simply reflects the fact that Pk(qk, yk) collects all the
13One can easily verify that the Bregman divergence (4.3) of the Gibbs penalty (2.9) is simply
the standard Kullback–Leibler divergence.
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terms of Fenchel’s inequality, so it is non-negative and (strictly) convex in both
arguments. Furthermore, we show in Proposition B.3 that Pk(qk, yk) is equal to
the associated Bregman divergence between qk and xk = Qk(yk) when the latter is
interior and that Pk(qk, yk) provides a proximity measure between qk and Qk(yk)
which is applicable even when hk is not steep.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Assume first that qk ∈ Xk is dominated by q′k ∈ Xk and let
Λk = {xk ∈ Xk : xkα = 0 for some α ∈ supp(qk)} be the union of all faces of Xk
that do not contain qk. By definition, qk becomes extinct along x(t) if and only if
xk(t)→ Λk as t→∞; therefore, in view of Proposition B.4, it suffices to show that
Pk(qk, yk(t))→ +∞.
To that end, consider the “cross-coupling”
Vk(yk) = Pk(qk, yk)− Pk(q′k, yk) = hk(qk)− hk(q′k)− 〈yk|qk − q′k〉 . (4.6)
Under the dynamics (RL), we then have:
d
dt
Vk(yk(t)) = −〈vk(x(t))|qk − q′k〉 = uk(q′k;x−k(t))− uk(qk;x−k(t)) ≥ δk > 0,
(4.7)
where δk = minx∈X{uk(q′k;x−k)− uk(qk;x−k)} denotes the minimum payoff differ-
ence between qk and q′k. Hence, with Pk(q
′
k, yk) ≥ 0 for all yk ∈ V ∗k (Proposition
B.3), we readily obtain
Pk(qk, yk(t)) ≥ Vk(yk(0)) + δkt, (4.8)
so every ω-limit of xk(t) belongs to Λk by Proposition B.4, i.e. qk becomes extinct.
To show that iteratively dominated strategies become extinct, we proceed by
induction on the rounds of elimination of dominated strategies. More precisely, let
Xrk ⊆ Xk denote the space of mixed strategies of player k that survive r rounds of
elimination so that all strategies qk /∈ Xrk become extinct along x(t); in particular,
if α /∈ Ark ≡ Ak ∩ Xrk, this implies that xkα(t) → 0 as t → ∞. Assume further
that qk ∈ Xrk survives for r elimination rounds but dies on the subsequent one, so
there exists some q′k ∈ Xrk with uk(q′k;x−k) > uk(qk;x−k) for all x ∈ Xr =
∏
` X
r
` .
With this in mind, decompose x ∈ X as x = xr + zr where xr is the (Euclidean)
projection of x on the subspace of X spanned by the surviving pure strategies Ar` ,
` ∈ N. Our induction hypothesis implies zr(t) = x(t)− xr(t)→ 0 as t→∞ (recall
that xkα(t)→ 0 for all α /∈ Ark), so, for large enough t, we have
|〈vk(x(t))|q′k − qk〉 − 〈vk(xr(t))|q′k − qk〉| < δrk/2, (4.9)
where δrk = minxr∈Xr{uk(q′k;xr−k)− uk(qk;xr−k)}.
By combining the above, we get
〈vk(x(t))|q′k − qk〉 = uk(q′k;x(t))− uk(qk;x(t)) > δrk/2 > 0 (4.10)
for large t, and our claim follows by plugging this last estimate into (4.7) and
arguing as in the base case r = 0. 
Remark 4.1. In the projection dynamics of Nagurney and Zhang [43], dominated
strategies need not be eliminated: although such strategies are selected against at
interior states, the dynamics’ solutions may enter and leave the boundary of X in
perpetuity, allowing dominated strategies to survive (Sandholm et al. [51]). Simi-
larly, there exist Carathéodory solutions of the projection dynamics (PD) that do
not eliminate dominated strategies (for instance, stationary trajectories at vertices
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corresponding to dominated strategies). By contrast, Theorem 4.1 shows that dom-
inated strategies become extinct along every weak solution orbit x(t) = projX y(t)
of (PD) that is induced by the projected reinforcement learning scheme (PL).
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 imposes no restrictions on different players’ choices of
regularized best response maps. For instance, dominated strategies become extinct
even if some players use the exponential learning scheme (XL) while others employ
the projection-driven process (PL). In fact, the proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that
the elimination of a player’s dominated strategies is a unilateral result: if a player
follows (RL), he ceases to play dominated strategies irrespective of what other
players are doing.
We now turn to the rate of elimination of dominated strategies. In the case
of the replicator dynamics, this rate is known to be exponential: if α ≺ β, then
xα(t) = O(exp(−ct)) for some c > 0 – see e.g. Weibull [59]. We show next that
the rate of elimination of dominated strategies under (RL) depends crucially on
the players’ choice of penalty function; in fact, if the players’ penalty functions are
nowhere steep, dominated strategies become extinct in finite time. For simplicity,
we focus on the decomposable case:
Proposition 4.2. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of the dynamics (RLγ) and
assume that the players’ penalty functions are of the form hk(xk) =
∑k
β θk(xkβ) for
some θk : [0, 1]→ R as in (2.6). If α ≺ β, then
xkα(t) ≤ [φk(ck − γkδkt)]+ , (4.11)
where φk = (θ′k)
−1, ck is a constant that only depends on the initial conditions of
(RL) and δk = min{vkβ(x) − vkα(x) : x ∈ X} is the minimum payoff difference
between α and β.
In particular, if θ′k(0) is finite, dominated strategies become extinct in finite time.
Proof. By the definition of the reinforcement learning dynamics (RLγ), we have:
y˙kα − y˙kβ = γk [vkα(x(t))− vkβ(x(t))] ≤ −γkδk, (4.12)
and hence:
ykα(t)− ykβ(t) ≤ ykα(0)− ykβ(0)− γkδkt. (4.13)
On the other hand, by the KKT conditions (A.2) for the softmax problem (2.7),
we obtain θ′k(xkα)− θ′k(xkβ) ≤ ykα− ykβ whenever xkα = Qkα(yk) > 0. Since θ′k is
bounded above on (0, 1], (4.13) gives
θ′k(xkα(t)) ≤ ck − γkδkt (4.14)
for some ck ∈ R and for all t such that xkα(t) > 0, so (4.11) follows. 
Remark 4.3. Proposition 4.2 shows that a player’s penalty function can be reverse-
engineered in terms of the desired rate of elimination of dominated strategies: to
achieve a target extinction rate φ, it suffices to pick a penalty kernel θ such that
θ′ = φ−1 (cf. Table 1). For instance, the Gibbs kernel θ(x) = x log x of (2.9) yields
the exponential extinction rate exp(c−δt) whereas the quadratic kernel (2.11) gives
the bound [c−δt]+ which shows that (PL) eliminates dominated strategies in finite
time.
Finally, for weakly dominated strategies, we obtain the following conditional
extinction result in the spirit of Weibull [59, Proposition 3.2]:
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Dynamics Penalty Kernel θ(x) Decay Rate φ(−y)
projection (PL) 12x
2 −y
replicator (RD) x log x exp(−y)
q-replicator (RDq)
[
q(1− q)]−1(x− xq) [q−1+(1−q)y]1/(q−1)
log-barrier (LD) − log x 1/y
Table 1. Rates of extinction of dominated strategies and convergence
to strict equilibria under the dynamics (RLγ) for different penalty ker-
nels θ. If α ≺ β and vkβ − vkα ≥ δ, the rate function φ is such that
xkα(t) ≤ [φ(c − γδt)]+ for some c ∈ R. Otherwise, if α ∈ Ak is the
component of a strict equilibrium x∗ and vk,0(x∗)− vkβ(x∗) ≥ δ > 0 for
all β ∈ Ak \{α}, the rate function φ is such that 1−xkα(t) ∼ [φ(−γδt)]+
for large t. If the penalty kernel θ is not steep at 0 (as in the projection
and q-replicator dynamics for q > 1), extinction of dominated strategies
and/or convergence to a strict equilibrium occurs in finite time.
Proposition 4.3. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) in X and let qk 4 q′k.
Then, qk becomes extinct along x(t) or every α−k ∈ A−k ≡
∏
` 6=k A` such that
uk(qk;α−k) < uk(q′k;α−k) becomes extinct along x(t).
Remark 4.4. The “or” above is not exclusive: the two extinction clauses could occur
simultaneously – see e.g. Weibull [59, Proposition 3.2] for the case of the replicator
dynamics.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. With notation as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we have:
V˙k = 〈vk(x(t))|q′k − qk〉 =
∑
α−k∈A′−k
[uk(q
′
k;α−k)− uk(qk;α−k)]xα−k(t), (4.15)
where xα−k ≡
∏
` 6=k x`,α` denotes the α−k-th component of x and A
′
−k = {α−k ∈
Ak : uk(qk;α−k) < uk(q′k;α−k)}. Integrating with respect to t, we see that Vk(y(t))
remains bounded if and only if the integrals
∫∞
0
xα−k(t) dt are all finite. However,
with x˙α−k(t) essentially bounded, the same argument as in the proof of Weibull
[59, Prop. 3.2] shows that
∫∞
0
xα−k(t) dt remains finite if xα−k(t) → 0 as t → ∞.
If this is not the case, we have limt→∞ Vk(y(t)) = +∞ and Proposition B.4 shows
that qk becomes extinct. 
5. Equilibrium, Stability and Convergence
We now turn to the long-term stability and convergence properties of the rein-
forcement dynamics (RL). Our analysis focuses on Nash equilibria, i.e. strategy
profiles x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗N ) ∈ X that are unilaterally stable in the sense that
uk(x
∗) ≥ uk(xk;x∗−k) for all xk ∈ Xk and for all k ∈ N, (5.1)
or, equivalently:
vkα(x
∗) ≥ vkβ(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗k) and for all β ∈ Ak, k ∈ N. (5.2)
If (5.1) is strict for all xk 6= x∗k, k ∈ N, we say that x∗ a strict equilibrium. Finally,
equilibria of restrictions of G are called restricted equilibria of G; in particular, x∗
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is a restricted equilibrium of G if (5.1) holds for every k ∈ N and for all xk with
supp(xk) ⊆ supp(x∗k).
Some basic long-term stability and convergence properties of the replicator dy-
namics for (asymmetric) normal form games can be summarized as follows:
(1) Nash equilibria are stationary.
(2) If an interior solution orbit converges, its limit is Nash.
(3) If a point is Lyapunov stable, then it is Nash.
(4) Strict equilibria are asymptotically stable.
Our aim in this section is to establish analogous results for the reinforcement learn-
ing scheme (RL). That said, since (RL) does not evolve directly on X (and the
induced strategy-based dynamics (RLD) are well-posed only when the players’
penalty functions are steep), the standard notions of stability and stationarity must
be modified accordingly.14
Definition 5.1. Let x∗ ∈ X and let y(t) be a solution orbit of (RL). We say that:
(1) x∗ is stationary under (RL) if x∗ ∈ imQ and Q(y(t)) = x∗ for all t ≥ 0
whenever Q(y(0)) = x∗.
(2) x∗ is Lyapunov stable under (RL) if, for every neighborhood U of x∗, there
exists a neighborhood U ′ of x∗ such that Q(y(t)) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 whenever
Q(y(0)) ∈ U ′.
(3) x∗ is attracting under (RL) if x∗ admits a neighborhood U such that
Q(y(t))→ x∗ as t→∞ whenever Q(y(0)) ∈ U .
(4) x∗ is asymptotically stable under (RL) if it is Lyapunov stable and attract-
ing.
Remark 5.1. In Definition 5.1, stationary points x∗ ∈ X are explicitly required
to belong to the image of the players’ choice map Q, but no such assumption is
made for stable states. From a propositional point of view, this is done to ensure
that points x∗ ∈ X \ imQ are not called stationary vacuously. From a dynamical
standpoint, stationary points should themselves be (constant) trajectories of the
dynamical system under study, whereas Lyapunov stable and attracting states only
need to be approachable by trajectories.
Since imQ ⊇ X◦, any point in X can be a candidate for (asymptotic) stabil-
ity under (RL); however, boundary points might not be suitable candidates for
stationarity, so stability does not imply stationarity (as would be the case for a
dynamical system defined on X). In particular, recall that x∗ /∈ imQ if and only if
some player’s penalty function is steep at x∗. As such, in the (steep) example of
exponential learning, x∗ ∈ X is stationary under (XL) if and only if it is an interior
stationary point of the replicator dynamics (RD); by contrast, in the (non-steep)
projection setting of (PD), any point in X may be stationary.
With this definition at hand, we obtain:
Theorem 5.2. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game, let x∗ ∈ X, and let x(t) =
Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) in X.
14The standard stability notions continue to apply in the dual space V ∗ where y(t) evolves;
however, since the mapping Q : V ∗ → X which defines the trajectories of play x(t) = Q(y(t)) in
X is neither injective nor surjective, this approach would not suffice to define stationarity and
stability on X.
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I. If x∗ is stationary under (RL), then it is a Nash equilibrium of G; conversely,
if x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G and x∗ ∈ imQ, x∗ is stationary under (RL).
II. If limt→∞ x(t) = x∗, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
III. If x∗ ∈ X is Lyapunov stable under (RL), then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
IV. If x∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, then it is also asymptotically stable
under (RL).
For steep and decomposable penalty functions, Parts I, III and IV of Theorem
5.2 essentially follow from Theorem 1 in Coucheney et al. [14] (see also Laraki and
Mertikopoulos [35, 36] for related results in a second order setting). Our proofs
mimic those of Coucheney et al. [14], but the lack of steepness means that we
must work directly on the dual space V ∗ of the score variables yk and rely on the
properties of the Fenchel coupling.
To prove Theorem 5.2, we need the following result (which is of independent
interest):
Proposition 5.3. If every neighborhood U of x∗ ∈ X admits an orbit xU (t) =
Q(yU (t)) of (RL) such that xU (t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume ad absurdum that x∗ is not Nash, so vkα(x∗) < vkβ(x∗) for some
player k ∈ N and for some α ∈ supp(x∗k), β ∈ Ak. Moreover, let U be a sufficiently
small neighborhood of x∗ in X such that vkβ(x) − vkα(x∗) ≥ δ > 0 for all x ∈ U .
Then, if x(t) = Q(y(t)) is an orbit of (RL) in X that is contained in U for all t ≥ 0,
we will have
ykα(t)− ykβ(t) = ykα(0)− ykβ(0) +
∫ t
0
[vkα(x(s))− vkβ(x(s))] ds ≤ c− δt, (5.3)
for some c ∈ R and for all t ≥ 0. This shows that ykα(t) − ykβ(t) → −∞ so,
by Proposition A.1, we must also have limt→∞ xkα(t) = 0. This contradicts our
original assumption that x(t) remains in a small enough neighborhood of x∗ (recall
that α ∈ supp(x∗k) by assumption), so x∗ must be Nash. 
With this result at hand, we may now proceed with the proof of Theorem 5.2:
Proof of Theorem 5.2.
Part I.. If x∗ is stationary under (RL), then Q(y(t)) = x∗ for some y(0) ∈ V ∗
and for all t ≥ 0; this shows that x∗ satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 5.3,
so x∗ must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Conversely, assume that x∗ is Nash with
x∗ = Q(y(0)) for some initial y(0) ∈ V ∗; we then claim that the trajectory y(t)
with ykα(t) = ykα(0) + vkα(x∗)t is the unique solution of (RL) starting at y(0).
Indeed, since vkβ(x∗) ≤ vkα(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗k) and for all β ∈ Ak, we have
ykα(t) = ykα(0) + ckt− dkαt where dkα = 0 if α ∈ supp(x∗k) and dkα ≥ 0 otherwise.
Proposition A.1 shows that Qk(yk(t)) = x∗k, so y(t) satisfies (RL) and our assertion
follows by the well-posedness of (RL).
Parts II and III.. The convergence and stability assumptions of Parts II and
III both imply the hypothesis of Proposition 5.3 so x∗ must be a Nash equilibrium
of G.
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Part IV.. Relabeling strategies if necessary, assume that x∗ = (α1,0, . . . , αN,0)
is a strict equilibrium of G, let A′k = Ak \{αk,0}, and consider the relative score
variables:
zkµ = ykµ − yk,0, µ ∈ A′k, (5.4)
so that
z˙kµ = vkµ(x)− vk,0(x). (5.5)
Proposition A.1 shows that xkµ → 0 whenever zkµ → −∞, so we also have x→ x∗
if zkµ → −∞ for all µ ∈ A′k, k ∈ N. Moreover, given that x∗ is a strict equilibrium,
the RHS of (5.5) is negative if x is close to x∗; as such, the main idea of our proof
will be to show that the relative scores zkµ escape to negative infinity when they
are not too large to begin with (i.e. when x(0) is close enough to x∗).
To make this precise, let δk = minµ∈A′k{vk,0(x∗)− vkµ(x∗)} > 0 and let ε > 0 be
such that vkµ(x)− vk,0(x) < −δk/2 for all x with ‖x− x∗‖2 < ε. Furthermore, let
Ph(x
∗, y) =
∑
k
Pk(x
∗
k, yk) =
∑
k
[hk(x
∗
k) + h
∗
k(yk)− 〈yk|x∗k〉] (5.6)
denote the Fenchel coupling between x∗ and y (cf. Appendix B), and set
U∗ε = {y ∈ V ∗ : Ph(x∗, y) < εKmin/2} (5.7)
where Kmin > 0 is the smallest strong convexity constant of the players’ penalty
functions. Proposition B.3 gives ‖Q(y)− x∗‖2 ≤ 2K−1minPh(x∗, y) < ε, so we will
also have vkµ(Q(y))− vk,0(Q(y)) < −δk/2 for all y ∈ U∗ε .
In view of the above, let y(t) be a solution of (RL) with y(0) ∈ U∗ε and let
τε = inf{t : y(t) /∈ U∗ε } be the first exit time of y(t) from U∗ε . Then, if τε <∞:
zkµ(τε) = zkµ(0)+
∫ τε
0
[vkµ(x(s))− vk,0(x(s))] ds ≤ zkµ(0)− 12δkτε < zkµ(0), (5.8)
for all µ ∈ A′k and for all k ∈ N. Intuitively, since the score differences yk,0 − ykµ
grow with t, x(τε) must be closer to x∗ than x(0), meaning that y(τε) ∈ U∗ε , a
contradiction. More rigorously, note that Pk(x∗k, yk) = hk(x
∗
k) + h
∗
k(yk) − yk,0;
since 〈yk|xk〉 = yk,0 +
∑
µ∈A′k xkµ(ykµ − yk,0), we will also have h
∗
k(yk) − yk,0 =
maxxk∈Xk{
∑
µ∈A′k xkµzkµ − hk(xk)}, so h
∗
k(y
′
k) − y′k,0 < h∗k(yk) − yk,0 whenever
z′kµ < zkµ for all µ ∈ A′k. In this way, (5.8) yields the contradictory statement
ε ≤ Ph(q, y(τε)) < Ph(q, y(0)) < ε, so y(t) must remain in U∗ε for all t ≥ 0. The
estimate (5.8) then shows that limt→∞ zkµ(t) = −∞, so limt→∞ xkµ(t) = 0 by
Proposition A.1. Therefore, limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
The above shows that y(t) is contained in U∗ε and Q(y(t))→ x∗ whenever y(0) ∈
U∗ε . To complete the proof, let Uε = {x ∈ X :
∑
kDhk(x
∗
k, xk) < εKmin/2} where
Dhk(x
∗
k, xk) is the Bregman divergence (B.4) between xk and x
∗
k. Propositions
B.2 and B.3 show that Uε is a neighborhood of x∗ in X with Q(U∗ε ) ⊆ Uε and
Q−1(Uε) = U∗ε , so x∗ is asymptotically stable under (RL). 
Remark 5.2. In the (asymmetric) replicator dynamics (RD), it is well known that
only strict equilibria can be attracting – so strict Nash equilibria and asymptotically
stable states coincide. One can extend this equivalence to (RL) by using restrictions
of G with smaller strategy sets to define the mixed strategy dynamics (RLD) on
the faces of X – for a related discussion, see Coucheney et al. [14].
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Theorem 5.2 shows that the reinforcement learning scheme (RL) exhibits essen-
tially the same long-run properties as the benchmark replicator dynamics. That
said, from a quantitative viewpoint, the situation can be quite different: as we show
below, the rate of convergence of (RL) to strict equilibria depends crucially on the
players’ penalty functions, and convergence can occur in finite time:
Proposition 5.4. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RLγ) in X and assume
that the players’ penalty functions are of the form hk(xk) =
∑k
β θk(xkβ) for some
θk : [0, 1]→ R as in (2.6). If x∗ = (α1,0, . . . , αN,0) is a strict Nash equilibrium and
x(0) is sufficiently close to x∗, then:
1− xk,0(t) ∼ [φk(−γkδkt)]+ , (5.9)
where φk = (θ′k)
−1 and δk = min
{
vk,0(x
∗)− vkµ(x∗) : µ ∈ Ak, µ 6= αk,0
}
.
In particular, if θ′k(0) is finite, convergence occurs in finite time.
Proof. Pick some ε > 0 and let U be a neighborhood of x∗ in X such that vk,0(x)−
vkµ(x) remains within (1 ± ε) of vk,0(x∗) − vkµ(x∗) for all x ∈ U and for all µ ∈
A′k = Ak \{αk,0}. If x(0) is sufficiently close to x∗, x(t) will remain in U for all
t ≥ 0 by Theorem 5.2; hence, the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4.2
yields
xkµ(t) ≤ [φk(ckµ − (1− ε)γkδkµt)]+ , (5.10)
where δkµ = vk,0(x∗)−vkµ(x∗) and ckµ is a constant depending on initial conditions.
Since ε can be taken arbitrarily small and x(t) → x∗ as t → ∞, the above yields
xkµ(t) ∼ [φk(−γkδkµt)]+ for large t; thus, letting δk = minµ δkµ, we finally obtain:
1− xk,0(t) =
∑
µ∈A′k
xkµ(t) ∼
∑
µ∈A′k
[φk(−γkδkµt)]+ ∼ [φk(−γkδkt)]+, (5.11)
which completes our proof. 
6. Time Averages and the Best Response Dynamics
As is well known, the replicator dynamics (RD) do not converge to equilibrium
when the game’s only Nash equilibrium is interior (for instance, as in Matching
Pennies and generic zero-sum games). On the other hand, if a replicator trajectory
stays away from the boundary of the simplex in a 2-player normal form game, its
time-average converges to the game’s Nash set – see e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund
[26, Chap. 7].
Under the reinforcement learning dynamics (RL), trajectories of play may enter
and exit the boundary of the game’s strategy space in perpetuity so the “per-
manence” criterion of staying a bounded distance away from bd(X) is no longer
natural. Instead, the conclusion about convergence of time averages can be reached
by requiring that differences between the scores of each player’s strategies remain
bounded:
Theorem 6.1. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) in X for a 2-player game G.
If the score differences ykα(t) − ykβ(t) remain bounded for all α, β ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2,
the time average x¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
x(s)ds of x(t) converges to the set of Nash equilibria
of G.
As with the classic result on time averages, our proof relies on the linearity (as
opposed to multilinearity) of each player’s payoff function, a property specific to
2-player games.
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Proof. By the definition of the dynamics (RL) we have:
ykα(t)− ykβ(t) = cαβ +
∫ t
0
[vkα(x(s))− vkβ(x(s))] ds
= cαβ + t · [vkα(x¯(t))− vkβ(x¯(t))] , (6.1)
where cαβ = ykα(0)− ykβ(0) and we used linearity to bring the integral inside the
argument of vkα and vkβ . Thus, dividing by t and taking the limit t→∞, we get
lim
t→∞ [vkα(x¯(t))− vkβ(x¯(t))] = 0, (6.2)
where we have used the assumption that ykα − ykβ is bounded. Hence, if x∗ is an
ω-limit of x(t), we will have vkα(x∗) = vkβ(x∗) for all α, β ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2, so x∗
must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Since X is compact, the ω-limit set of x(t) is
nonempty and our assertion follows. 
Remark 6.1. To see how Theorem 6.1 implies the corresponding result for the
replicator dynamics, simply note that ykα − ykβ = log xkα − log xkβ under (XL).
Therefore, if x(t) stays away from the boundary of the simplex, the requirement of
Theorem 6.1 is fulfilled and we recover the classical result of Hofbauer and Sigmund
[26].
The standard example of a 2-player game that cycles under the replicator dy-
namics is the zero-sum game of Matching Pennies (MP) with payoff bimatrix:
UMP =
(
(1,−1) (−1, 1)
(−1, 1) (1,−1)
)
. (6.3)
In particular, the unique equilibrium of the game is x∗1 = x∗2 = (1/2, 1/2), and it
can be shown that the Kullback–Leibler divergence
DKL(x
∗, x) =
∑
k
∑k
α
x∗kα log
(
x∗kα
/
xkα
)
(6.4)
is a constant of motion for (RD). As a result, replicator trajectories always stay
away from the boundary of X, so their time averages converge to the game’s (unique)
equilibrium. In our more general setting, we obtain:
Proposition 6.2. Let G be a 2-player zero-sum game, i.e. u1 = −u2. Then,
the time average x¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
x(s) ds of every orbit x(t) = Q(y(t)) of (RL) in X
converges to the Nash set of G.
Proof. Let x∗ be an interior Nash equilibrium and let Ph(x∗, y) =
∑
k=1,2
[
hk(x
∗
k)+
h∗k(yk)− 〈yk|x∗k〉
]
denote the Fenchel coupling between x∗ and y (cf. Appendix B).
Then, by Lemma B.6, we get:
d
dt
Ph(x
∗, y) = 〈v1(x)|x1 − x∗1〉+ 〈v2(x)|x2 − x∗2〉
= u1(x1, x2)− u1(x∗1, x2) + u2(x1, x2)− u2(x1, x∗2) = 0 (6.5)
on account of the game being zero-sum.
The above shows that Ph(x∗, y(t)) remains constant along (RL). Proposition B.5
then implies that yα(t)− yβ(t) is bounded, so our assertion follows from Theorem
6.1. 
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(a) Exponential reinforcement learning.
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(b) Projected reinforcement learning.
Figure 2. Time averages in Matching Pennies under the exponen-
tial learning scheme (XL) and the projected reinforcement learning dy-
namics (PL). In both cases, solution trajectories (green) cycle, either
avoiding the boundary bd(X) of X (replicator) or attaining it infinitely
often (projection); on the other hand, their time averages (blue) con-
verge to the game’s equilibrium. In both cases, the dynamics have been
integrated over the same time horizon, showing that (PL) evolves sig-
nificantly faster than (XL).
In the case of the replicator dynamics, a heuristic explanation for the above
is that time averages of replicator trajectories in 2-player games exhibit the same
long-run behavior as the best-reply dynamics of Gilboa and Matsui [21]:
x˙k ∈ brk(xk)− xk. (BRD)
More precisely, Hofbauer et al. [27] showed that the ω-limit set Ω of a time-averaged
replicator orbit is internally chain transitive under (BRD): any two points x, y ∈ Ω
may be joined by a piecewise continuous curve (a “chain”) consisting of arbitrarily
long pieces of orbits in Ω broken by arbitrarily small jump discontinuities (see
Benaïm et al. [8] for the precise definition).
As it turns out, this property extends verbatim to the learning scheme (RL):
Theorem 6.3. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) in X for a 2-player game G.
Then, the ω-limit set of the time average x¯(t) of x(t) is internally chain transitive
under the best reply dynamics (BRD).
The proof of Theorem 6.3 follows closely Hofbauer et al. [27, Proposition 5.1]
and relies on the following proposition – itself a generalization of (and proved in
the same way as) Proposition 4.2 in Hofbauer et al. [27]:
Proposition 6.4. Let x(t) = Q(y(t)) be an orbit of (RL) for a 2-player game G.
Then, x(t) lies within δ(t) of br(x¯(t)) in the uniform norm on X and the approxi-
mation error δ(t) tends to 0 as t→∞.
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Proof. From the definition of the dynamics (RL), and using the fact that vk is linear
in 2-player games, we readily obtain:
yk(t) = yk(0) +
∫ t
0
vk(x(s)) ds = yk(0) + t · vk(x¯(t)). (6.6)
Hence, xk(t) = Qk(yk(t)) is the (unique) maximizer of the strictly concave problem:
maximize 〈vk(x¯(t))|x′k〉+ t−1 [〈yk(0)|x′k〉 − h(x′k)] ,
subject to x′k ∈ Xk.
(6.7)
Therefore, with y(0)/t → 0 as t → ∞ and h finite and continuous on Xk, the
maximum theorem of Berge [9, p. 116] shows that xk(t) lies within a vanishing
distance of brk(x¯(t)) = arg maxx′k∈Xk 〈vk(x¯(t)|x′k〉, as claimed. 
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Following Hofbauer et al. [27], differentiate x¯(t) to obtain
d
dt
x¯(t) =
x(t)
t
− 1
t2
∫ t
0
x(s) ds =
1
t
(x(t)− x¯(t)) . (6.8)
After changing time to τ = log t, this expression gives ddτ x¯ = x− x¯, so Proposition
6.4 shows that x¯(τ) tracks a perturbed version of the best reply dynamics (BRD)
in the sense of Benaïm et al. [8, Definition II]. Our assertion then follows from
Theorem 3.6 in Benaïm et al. [8]. 
We close this section with some easy corollaries of Theorem 6.3: first, if the
time average of a solution orbit x(t) = Q(y(t)) of (RL) converges, its limit must be
Nash; second, if (BRD) is globally attracted to some x∗ ∈ X◦, the time averages
of (RL) also converge to x∗. These conclusions can be seen as generalizations of
the corresponding statements in Hofbauer et al. [27] for interior replicator orbits;
in our more general setting however, these conclusions hold for every orbit of (RL)
in X, even those that enter and then leave bd(X) – e.g. as in the Matching Pennies
example of Fig. 2.
7. On Non-Regularized Best Responses
We conclude this paper with an informal discussion of the following question:
what happens if regularized best responses are replaced by the actual best response
correspondences brk(yk) = arg maxxk∈Xk 〈yk|xk〉 of (2.4)?
Given that brk : V ∗k ⇒ Xk is multi-valued, running (RL) with ordinary best
responses leads to the differential inclusion:
y˙k = vk(x),
xk ∈ brk(yk), (7.1)
or, more concisely:
y˙ ∈ v(br(y)), (7.2)
where br ≡ (br1, . . . , brN ) : V ∗ ⇒ X denotes the players’ best response correspon-
dence profile. Since this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with (nonempty)
convex values contained in a compact set, standard results imply that (7.2) admits
absolutely continuous solutions that are defined for all t ≥ 0, although multiple
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(b) Projected best responses.
Figure 3. Logit and projected best responses for different noise lev-
els (Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) respectively). We consider a player with two
actions A = {0, 1} and z = y1 − y0 denotes the score difference be-
tween the two. The player’s regularized best response map Q1(y) for
different noise levels η = γ−1 is given by (3.9) for the logit case, and by
min{1,max{0, (1 + η−1z)/2}} for the projection case.
solutions may emanate from a single initial condition (Aubin and Cellina [3]).15 By
going through the proofs of the corresponding results, it can then be shown that
(1) In generic games, any absolutely continuous solution x(t) of (7.2) is piece-
wise constant and occupies the vertices of X for an open, dense set of times.
(2) Dominated strategies are eliminated under (7.2) in finite time.
(3) A point x∗ ∈ X is stationary under (7.2) if and only if it is a Nash equilib-
rium.
(4) If x∗ is a strict equilibrium, then it attracts an open set of initial conditions
y(0) ∈ V ∗ such that br(y(0)) is close enough to x∗; however, since solutions
of (7.2) are piecewise constant (at least, generically), this result adds little
to the stationarity result above.
(5) Time-averaged trajectories of (7.2) converge to Nash equilibrium in 2-player
zero-sum games: trajectories of play x(t) might jump from vertex to vertex
in perpetuity, but the empirical frequency of play converges to the game’s
set of Nash equilibria.
Perhaps the best way to understand these properties of (7.2) is to take the
reinforcement learning scheme (RL) with a very small noise level η ≈ 0 as in (3.10).
In Fig. 3, we focus on the entropic and quadratic penalties (2.9) and (2.11), and we
plot the induced regularized best response maps for different noise levels η when
the player has two pure strategies. Up to a time shift, these plots also describe the
behavior of the solution orbits of (3.10) for a single-player game with fixed payoff
difference v1 − v0 ≡ 1 (simply note that the player’s score difference z satisfies
z˙ = v1 − v0 = 1). In the logit case (Fig. 3(a)), the weight on the dominated
strategy vanishes at an exponential rate, and this rate of decay increases as the
noise level η tends to 0 (cf. Table 1); however, the dominated strategy is played
15The same reasoning shows that the strong convexity requirement of Definition 2.1 can be
replaced by strict convexity (at the cost of Lipschitz continuity for x(t)) or even convexity (at the
cost of passing to a differential inclusion with possibly discontinuous branchings).
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with positive probability for all time. In the projection case however, the player
assigns positive weight on both actions only within a window whose width goes to
0 as the noise level η tends to 0 (cf. Fig. 3(b)); thus, if the player starts with a
high score difference in favor of the dominated strategy, this difference will decrease
linearly until it reaches that window, and the player will then transit sharply to the
dominant strategy. Either way, the behavior of the dynamics (7.2) is recovered in
the limit η → 0.
Appendix A. Properties of Regularized Best Response Maps
In this appendix, we prove some intuitive properties of regularized best responses
that were invoked in the main text. For simplicity, all results will be stated for the
d-dimensional simplex ∆ ≡ ∆(A) of V = Rd+1 that is spanned by the index set
A = {0, 1, . . . , d}. We have:
Proposition A.1. Let h be a penalty function on ∆ and let Q : V ∗ → ∆ be its
induced choice map. Then:
i. Q(y′) = Q(y) for all y, y′ ∈ V ∗ such that y′ − y ∝ (1, . . . , 1).
ii. Q(y − teβ) = Q(y) for all t ≥ 0 and for all y ∈ V ∗ such that Qβ(y) = 0.
iii. Qα(y)→ 0 whenever yα − yβ → −∞ for some β 6= α.
The first part of Proposition A.1 shows that modifying all payoffs by the same
amount does not change relative advantages between strategies, so regularized best
responses remain invariant along (1, . . . , 1). The second part shows that regularized
best responses also remain unchanged if one reduces the payoff of an action that
already has a strategy share of 0; finally, the last part states that the strategy share
of an action becomes vanishingly small when the payoff of said action is at a great
relative disadvantage to that of another action.
Proof of Proposition A.1. For the first part, assume that y′α = yα+c for some c ∈ R
and for all α ∈ A. Then:
Q(y′) = arg maxx∈∆
{ 〈y|x〉+∑β xβ · c− h(x)}
= arg maxx∈∆{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} = Q(y). (A.1)
For the second part, the first order Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for
the regularized problem (2.7) give
yβ − ∂h
∂xβ
∣∣∣∣
Q(y)
= µ− νβ (β = 0, . . . ,m), (A.2)
where µ ∈ R is the Lagrange multiplier of the equality constraint ∑β xβ = 1 and
να ≥ 0 is the complementary slackness multiplier of the inequality constraint xα ≥ 0
– i.e. να = 0 for all α ∈ supp(Q(y)). Hence, if we let y′α = yα − tδαβ for some
β /∈ supp(Q(y)) and set µ′ = µ and ν′α = να+tδαβ ≥ 0, Q(y) also satisfies the KKT
conditions of (2.7) for y′ with Lagrange multipliers µ′ and ν′α. Since h is strictly
convex, it follows that Q(y′) = Q(y), as claimed.
Finally, for the last part, let yn be a sequence in V ∗ such that yn,α−yn,β → −∞,
set xn = Q(yn), and assume (by descending to a subsequence if necessary) that
xn,α > ε > 0 for all n. By definition, we then have
〈yn|xn〉 − h(xn) ≥ 〈yn|x′〉 − h(x′) (A.3)
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for all x′ ∈ ∆. Therefore, if we set x′n = xn + ε(eβ − eα), we readily get
ε(yn,α − yn,β) ≥ h(xn)− h(x′n) ≥ −(hmax − hmin), (A.4)
which contradicts our original assumption that yn,α − yn,β → −∞. With ∆ com-
pact, the above shows that x∗α = 0 for any limit point x∗ of xn, i.e. Qα(yn)→ 0. 
Appendix B. Bregman Divergences and the Fenchel Coupling
In this appendix, we introduce Bregman divergences and the Fenchel coupling,
and we discuss their basic properties.
As before, let h : ∆→ R be a penalty function on the unit d-dimensional simplex
∆ of V ≡ Rd+1. For convenience, we will treat h as an extended-real-valued function
h : V → R by setting h(x) = +∞ for all x ∈ V \∆. The subdifferential of h at
x ∈ V is then defined as ∂h(x) = {y ∈ V ∗ : h(x′) ≥ h(x)+〈y|x′ − x〉 for all x′ ∈ V }
and we will say that h is subdifferentiable at x whenever ∂h(x) is nonempty. This
is always the case if x ∈ ∆◦, so we have ∆◦ ⊆ dom ∂h ≡ {x ∈ ∆ : ∂h(x) 6= ∅} ⊆ ∆.
A key tool in our analysis is the convex conjugate h∗ : V ∗ → R of h defined as
h∗(y) = maxx∈∆{〈y|x〉 − h(x)}. (B.1)
As it turns out, the choice map Q : V ∗ → ∆ induced by h is simply the differential
of h∗:
Proposition B.1. Let h be a penalty function on ∆. The induced choice map
Q : V ∗ → ∆ is Lipschitz and Q(y) = dh∗(y) for all y ∈ V ∗.
Proof. By Theorem 23.5 in Rockafellar [48], we readily obtain
x ∈ ∂h∗(y) ⇐⇒ y ∈ ∂h(x) ⇐⇒ x ∈ arg maxx′∈∆{〈y|x′〉 − h(x′)}. (B.2)
Since the last set only contains Q(y), we immediately obtain Q(y) = dh∗(y). The
Lipschitz property for Q then follows from the strong convexity of h – see e.g.
Nesterov [45]. 
Remark B.1. Proposition B.1 is folklore in convex optimization – see e.g. Hofbauer
and Sandholm [24], Nesterov [45], Shalev-Shwartz [52], Kwon and Mertikopoulos
[33] and many others. Equation (B.2) also shows that the image of Q is precisely
dom ∂h, a fact which we use freely in the rest of this appendix.
Given a basepoint q ∈ ∆, the one-sided derivative
h′(x; q − x) = lim
t→0+
t−1 [h(x+ t(q − x))− h(x)] (B.3)
exists for all x ∈ ∆ and is finite whenever x lies in the relative interior of a face of
∆ that also contains q. With this in mind, we define the Bregman divergence of h
as
Dh(q, x) = h(q)− h(x)− h′(x; q − x) for all q, x ∈ ∆, (B.4)
with Dh(q, x) possibly attaining the value +∞ if h′(x; q − x) = −∞.16 We then
have:
16Usually, Bregman divergences are defined for x ∈ dom ∂h – Kiwiel [32] uses the notation
D′h to distinguish (B.4) from the original definition of Bregman [11]. The “raison d’ être” of the
more general definition (B.4) is that we often need to work with boundary points x ∈ bd(∆) with
∂h(x) = ∅.
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Proposition B.2. Let h be a K-strongly convex penalty function on ∆ and let ∆q
be the union of the relative interiors of the faces of ∆ that contain q, i.e.
∆q = {x ∈ ∆ : supp(x) ⊇ supp(q)} = {x ∈ ∆ : xα > 0 whenever qα > 0}. (B.5)
Then:
i. Dh(q, x) < +∞ whenever x ∈ ∆q.
ii. Dh(q, x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ ∆ and Dh(q, x) = 0 if and only if q = x; in particular:
Dh(q, x) ≥ 1
2
K ‖x− q‖2 for all x ∈ ∆. (B.6)
iii. Dh(q, xn)→ Dh(q, x) whenever xn → x in ∆q.
Proof. Let z = q − x. If x ∈ ∆q, h(x + tz) is finite and smooth for all t in a
neighborhood of 0 so h′(x; q − x) – and hence Dh(q, x) – must be finite as well.
For part (ii), positive-definiteness is a trivial consequence of strict convexity; on
the other hand, strong convexity yields:
h(x+ tz) ≤ th(q) + (1− t)h(x)− 1
2
Kt(1− t) ‖z‖2 . (B.7)
Moreover, with h(x) finite, we also get h(x+ tz) ≥ h(x) + th′(x; z), so (B.7) gives:
h(x) + th′(x; z) ≤ th(q) + (1− t)h(x)− 1
2
Kt(1− t) ‖z‖2 . (B.8)
After rearranging and dividing by t, the above becomes
h(q)− h(x)− h′(x; z) ≥ 1
2
K(1− t) ‖z‖2 , (B.9)
so (B.6) is obtained by letting t→ 0.
Finally, if xn → q, part (iii) follows from Kiwiel [32, Lemma 8.2]. Otherwise, if
limxn 6= q, let zn = q−xn and take ε > 0 such that xn+ tzn ∈ ∆ for all t ∈ (−ε, ε)
and for all sufficiently large n (recall that ∆q is relatively open in ∆ so xn ∈ ∆q for
large enough n). Furthermore, let fn(t) = h(xn + tzn) and let f(t) = h(x+ tz) for
t ∈ (−ε, ε); since fn and f are smooth, convex and fn → f pointwise, we obtain
h′(xn; q − xn) = f ′n(0) → f ′(0) = h′(x; q − x) by Theorem 25.7 in Rockafellar
[48]. 
Dually to the above, h also induces a convex coupling Ph : ∆× V ∗ → R with
Ph(q, y) = h(q) + h
∗(y)− 〈y|q〉 for all q ∈ ∆, y ∈ V ∗. (B.10)
This primal-dual coupling is (strictly) convex in both arguments and positive-se-
midefinite by Fenchel’s inequality, so we call it the Fenchel coupling between q and
y. The next proposition establishes the duality relation between Dh and Ph:
Proposition B.3. Let h be a K-strongly convex penalty function on ∆ and let
q ∈ ∆. Then, Ph(q, y) ≥ 12K ‖Q(y)− q‖2 for all y ∈ V ∗ and Ph(q, y) → 0 if and
only if Q(y)→ q; furthermore:
Ph(q, y) = Dh(q, x) whenever Q(y) = x and x ∈ ∆q. (B.11)
Remark B.2. The first part of Proposition B.3 is not implied by the second because
imQ = dom ∂h is not necessarily contained in ∆q.
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Proof. For the first part of the proposition, let x = Q(y) so that h∗(y) = 〈y|x〉 −
h(x). Then:
Ph(q, y) = h(q)− h(x)− 〈y|q − x〉 . (B.12)
With y ∈ ∂h(x), we also get
h(x+ t(q − x)) ≥ h(x) + t 〈y|q − x〉 for all t ∈ [0, 1], (B.13)
so, by combining (B.13) with (B.7) as in the proof of Prop. B.2, we obtain
h(q)− h(x)− 〈y|q − x〉 ≥ 1
2
K ‖x− q‖2 , (B.14)
and our claim follows.
As for (B.11), if x ∈ ∆q, the function h(x+ t(q− x)) is finite and smooth for all
t in a neighborhood of 0 (simply note that x+ t(q−x) lies in the relative interior of
a face of ∆ for small t). Thus, since y ∈ ∂h(x) and h admits a two-sided derivative
at x along q − x, we will also have h′(x; q − x) = 〈y|q − x〉, so (B.11) follows from
(B.12). 
Intuitively, Proposition B.3 shows that the Fenchel coupling Ph(q, y) between q
and y measures the proximity of Q(y) to q; as such, if Ph(q, y) grows large, Q(y)
must be moving away from q. We formalize this as follows:
Proposition B.4. If Ph(q, yn) → +∞ for some sequence yn ∈ V ∗, the sequence
xn = Q(yn) has no limit points in ∆q; in particular, lim infn→∞{xn,α : α ∈
supp(q)} = 0.
Proof. By descending to a subsequence of xn = Q(yn) if necessary, assume that
limxn = x
∗ ∈ ∆q. Since ∆q is relatively open in ∆, we must eventually have xn ∈
∆q, so Proposition B.2 gives Dh(q, xn) → Dh(q, x∗) < +∞. However, with xn ∈
∆q, Proposition B.3 also yields Dh(q, xn) = Ph(q, yn)→ +∞, a contradiction. 
The following result may be seen as a weak partial converse to the above:
Proposition B.5. Let q ∈ ∆◦. If Ph(q, yn) is bounded, then yn,α − yn,β is also
bounded for all α, β = 0, 1, . . . , d.
Proof. Assume ad absurdum that Ph(q, yn) is bounded but yn,α − yn,β → +∞
for some α, β ∈ A ≡ {0, 1, . . . , d}. Then, by relabeling indices and passing to a
subsequence if necessary, we may assume that a) yn,α ≥ yn,κ ≥ yn,β for all κ ∈ A;
and b) the index set A can be partitioned into two nonempty sets, A+ and A−,
such that yn,α − yn,κ is bounded for all κ ∈ A+ while yn,α − yn,κ → +∞ for all
κ ∈ A− (obviously, α ∈ A+ and β ∈ A−). Hence, letting xn = Q(yn), we readily
obtain:
〈yn|q − xn〉 =
∑
κ∈A
yn,κ(qκ − xn,κ) =
∑
κ∈A
(yn,κ − yn,α)(qκ − xn,κ)
=
∑
κ∈A+
(yn,κ − yn,α)(qκ − xn,κ) +
∑
κ∈A−
(yn,κ − yn,α)(qκ − xn,κ).
(B.15)
The first sum above is bounded by assumption. As for the second one, Proposition
A.1 gives xn,κ → 0 as n → ∞ for all κ ∈ A−, so lim infn(qκ − xn,κ) > 0 (recall
that q ∈ ∆◦). We thus obtain ∑κ∈A−(yn,κ − yn,α)(qκ − xn,κ) → −∞ and, hence,
〈yn|q − xn〉 = h(q)− h(xn)− Ph(q, yn)→ −∞, a contradiction. 
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Our final result shows that the Fenchel coupling evolves in a particularly simple
fashion under the reinforcement learning dynamics (RL):
Lemma B.6. Let y(t) be a solution orbit of (RL). Then, for all qk ∈ Xk, we have:
d
dt
Phk(qk, yk(t)) = 〈vk(x(t))|xk(t)− qk〉 . (B.16)
Proof. By the differential formulation (3.1) of the dynamics (RL), we readily obtain:
d
dt
Phk(qk, yk) =
d
dt
h∗k(yk)− 〈y˙k|qk〉
= 〈y˙k|dh∗k(yk)〉 − 〈vk|qk〉 = 〈vk|Qk(yk)− qk〉 = 〈vk|xk − qk〉 ,
(B.17)
where the first equality in the second line follows from the chain rule and the
penultimate one from the fact that Qk = dh∗k (Proposition B.1). 
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